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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most persistent problems in private law has concerned the
process by which private assets pass from their owner on the owner's death
to those who, by law, are next entitled to enjoy them. In primitive societies
organized around the family, many assets probably were viewed as belong-
ing to the family.' However, since social and governmental organizations
have become more complex and individual ownership of real and personal
property has developed, the law has experienced a continual state of evolu-
tion. As commercial activity and demands of the public fisc increased, the
law became concerned about assuring that creditors, who had indirectly
contributed to the decedent's accumulation of wealth, were paid and that a
fair share of the costs of government, which permitted and protected the
* Max Rowe Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. See T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 6 (2d ed. 1953); H.
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 177 (1861). Cf K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEY-
ENNE WAY 212, 251 (1941); Adam, Inheritance Law in Primitive Cultures, 20 IOWA L.
REV. 760 (1935); Beaglehole, Ownership and Inheritance in an American Indian Tribe, 20
IOWA L. REV. 304 (1935).
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accumulation, were recovered before the assets were distributed to the new
owners.2 Although many of the concepts found in modern laws of succes-
sion can be traced to early Roman law, most European countries developed
different methods of accommodating the interests of the various parties in-
volved in succession from those developed in England and the United
States.3 Most of the civil law countries, like France and Germany, have
utilized the concept of universal succession by which the heirs receive the
title to the decedent's assets directly on death and also become obligated to
pay any liabilities of the decedent.4 The heirs, who were viewed as suc-
ceeding to the decedent's person and standing in the decedent's shoes, re-
ceived the benefit of his assets and the burden of his obligations. Third
parties, who would have looked to the decedent, looked to the heirs after the
decedent's death. In brief, the heirs owned the assets and, upon acceptance
of the inheritance, owed the decedent's debts as their own.5 Consequently,
the heirs reduced the decedent's assets to possession, paid the decedent's
debts and creditors, paid any taxes due, and also paid the legacies in any
will of the decedent. On the other hand, English law interposed a personal
representative, the administrator or executor, as an independent responsible
person to collect the assets, discharge debts and claims before making distri-
bution of the net balance to the heirs or distributees who were to be the
next beneficial owners.6 Nearly all of the states of the United States
adopted and further developed the English system of probate and adminis-
tration. However, Louisiana, with its background of the French civil law,
followed the civil law pattern, 7 as did Quebec and nearly all the Latin
American countries.
The objectives of both the civil law and the common law approaches
are the same: to collect the decedent's assets with dispatch, to satisfy any
2. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 59, 221, 371 (1973).
3. M. AMOS & F. WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 288 (3d ed.
1967).
4. M. AMOS & F. WALTON, supra note 3, at 305; A. BEECHER, WILLS & Es-
TATES UNDER GERMAN LAW 7 (1958); E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAw 257
(2d ed. 1968); P. PELLERIN, THE FRENCH LAW OF WILLS, PROBATE ADMINISTRA-
TION 2 (3d ed. 1933); 2 J. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE & MULTINATIONAL ESTATE
PLANNING app. K, at 619 (1982); Brown, The French Practice of Administration of Es-
tates, 3 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 624 (1954); Brown, Winding Up Deceaents' Estates in
French and English Law, 33 TUL. L. REv. 631 (1959); Rheinstein, European Methodsfor
the Liquidation of the Debts of Deceased Persons, 20 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1935).
5. C. AUBRY & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 611 (C. Lazarus trans.
1971); H. DE VRIES, N. GALSTON & R. LOENING, FRENCH LAw 4-50 (1982); M.
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE 1953, 2011 (11 th ed. 1938).
6. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 9; M. RHEINSTEIN, CASES ON DECE-
DENTS' ESTATES 562 (2d ed. 1955); 1 W. WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINIS-
TRATION §§ 137, 138 (3d ed. 1923); Brown, Winding Up Decedents' Estates in French
and English Law, 33 TUL. L. REV. 631 (1959); Rheinstein, supra note 4.
7. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 561.
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obligations to creditors, government, or others incident to the termination
of the decedent's life, and to complete the transmission of his property to
those beneficially entitled with the minimum expense of time and money.
In both systems, the process is one of liquidation so the new owners can
enjoy the assets free and clear without interruption from the claimants of
the past. As both systems developed, modifications were made to accom-
modate the interests of different parties.' In the civil law, the heir could
avoid liability to the decedent's creditors in excess of the value of the estate
by renouncing, by accepting only to the extent of the value of the assets, i.e.,
with benefit of inventory, or by instituting a process similar to bankruptcy
to separate the assets of the decedent from those of the heir and, in that
way, protect the heir's own assets.9 Under the civil law in most countries, a
person could be appointed to intercede as an administrator in an insolvent
estate and often this would be the heir himself.I° In the United States and
England, procedures were frequently developed by which formal adminis-
tration could be shortened or avoided and the decedent's assets distributed
or passed directly into the possession and enjoyment of the heirs or devi-
sees."1 Because land was often not available for creditors except in extreme
cases, the law of most states of the United States provided for direct devolu-
tion of title and possession of land to the heirs or devisees without adminis-
tration. As the western United States developed, with some civil law
antecedents and a quite general lack of concern for judicial formalities rein-
forced by great distances from the courthouse, many experiments emerged
providing for informal means of satisfying the functions of formal adminis-
tration. Homestead and exemption laws permitted continued possession
and enjoyment of assets with only modest affidavit procedures. Community
property was often set off to the surviving spouse with little in the way of
formalities. Texas and Washington provided for the independent executor
who essentially accounted only to the family, and nearly all states provided
for summary administration of small estates. As a consequence, the ap-
proaches of the civil law's universal succession and the common law's ad-
ministration of decedents' estates were frequently different in name only
and were often functionally quite similar.
1 2
This Article will attempt to demonstrate these common developments
as an introduction to the consideration in the United States of a statutory
form of succession without administration somewhat similar to civil law
universal succession, which, it is submitted, is the result of the normal evolu-
8. See Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES
AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9, 18 (E. Halbach, Jr. ed. 1977).
9. See authorities cited note 5 supra.
10. M. AMOS & F. WALTON, supra note 3, at 308.
11. Basye, Dispensing with Administration, 44 MICH. L. REV. 329, 332 (1945).
12. See Basye, supra note 11, at 330; see also Brown, Winding Up Decedents' Estates
in French and English Law, 33 TUL. L. REv. 631, 631 (1959) ("the differences are
more apparent than real"); Rheinstein, supra note 4, at 469.
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tion in American efforts to transmit assets from generation to generation
with maximum economy of time and value.
II. INFORMAL ADMINISTRATION AND FAMILY SETTLEMENTS
The identification of the recipients of an estate usually is not very diffi-
cult in most intestate estates. The heirs, as members of the family, are usu-
ally known and not questioned. This was particularly true when our
population and communities were small. The adult heirs usually could
prove their heirship by an affidavit stating their relationship and that of
minors to the decedent. Since contests were rare, this was routinely an in-
formal matter, often combined with the appointment of the personal repre-
sentative whose priority was provided by statute. Because little concern was
raised by the family or creditors in the routine cases, informality was the
rule. In many states, this informality probably resulted in the practical
equivalent of independent administration." This was particularly true
when most assets consisted of a farm home, as homestead, and farm imple-
ments, as either exempt property or part of the homestead, in which event
the administrator's task was primarily to pay off the few creditors and to file
a simple account for discharge. Consequently, if creditors were paid by the
heirs or an arrangement satisfactory to them was made, there was nothing
that called for the appointment of an administrator.
If the decedent left a will, probate in common form, i.e., without no-
tice, was available as an informal appearance process, often permitted upon
affidavit or informal deposition of the attesting witnesses. This in turn
could be followed in many cases with an administration of little more for-
mality than in the routine intestacy. Since so few deaths resulted in probate
proceedings and many estates were never formally closed, informal admin-
istration of a decedent's estate was common in the United States until the
early 1900's. 4
This early informality in probate and administration was reinforced by
the development of the family settlement doctrine. Many cases recognized,
approved, and enforced agreements by the successors not to probate a will'"
13. See Marschall, Independent Administration of Decedents'Estates, 33 TEX. L. REv.
95 (1954); see also Fratcher, The English Sstem: Simplied Probate in a Similar Context,
in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 152, 160 (E. Halbach, Jr. ed. 1977);
Scoles, Probate Reform, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 136, 145 (E.
Halbach, Jr. ed. 1977).
14. See Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission on
Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241 (1963); Plager, Spouse's Nonbarrable Share.- A Solution in
Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1966); Powell & Looker, Decedents' Es-
tates, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 919 (1930); see aso M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH,
THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE (1970).
15. See, e.g., Brakefield v. Baldwin, 249 Ky. 106, 60 S.W.2d 376 (1933); Phillips
v. Phillips, 8 La. 195 (1839); Henderson v. Bishop, 250 Pa. 484, 95 A. 663 (1915);
Stringfellow v. Early, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 597, 40 S.W. 871 (1897); see also Annot., 29
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or administer an estate1 6 but rather to pay the debts and distribute the
decedent's assets among agreeing family members. Because only interested
parties can initiate probate or administration proceedings, if all interested
parties agree to forego administration, nothing happens to initiate proceed-
ings. As long as creditors and taxes are paid, there may be no one to com-
plain." The courts frequently encouraged family settlements by such
observations as:
Formal proceedings for the settlement of an estate are never neces-
sary if all parties concerned can agree to dispense with them ....
Family arrangements for this purpose, it is said, are favorites of
the law, and when fairly made are never allowed to be disturbed
by the parties, or by any others for them.
' 8
The parties to an agreement to settle an estate without administration
were viewed as bound by their agreement and precluded from later opening
administration.' 9 Likewise, the executor named in a will frequently lacked
A.L.R.3d 8 (1970). This earlier view continues to be followed. See Love v. Rennie,
254 Ala. 382, 48 So. 2d 458 (1950); In re Estates of Thompson, 226 Kan. 437, 601
P.2d 1105 (1979); Henry v. Spurlin, 277 Ky. 114, 125 S.W.2d 992 (1939); Holt v.
Holt, 47 N.C. App. 618, 267 S.E.2d 711 (1980); Muller v. Sprenger, 105 N.W.2d 433
(N.D. 1960); In re Way's Estate, 379 Pa. 421, 109 A.2d 164 (1954); Salmon v.
Salmon, 395 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1965).
16. See, e.g., Waterhouse v. Churchill, 30 Colo. 415, 70 P. 678 (1902); Barron v.
Burney, 38 Ga. 264 (1868); Gwinn v. Melvin, 9 Idaho 202, 72 P. 961 (1903); Chris-
tie v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 104 Iowa 707, 74 N.W. 697 (1898); Brown v. Baxter,
77 Kan. 97, 94 P. 155 (1908); Foote v. Foote, 61 Mich. 181, 28 N.W. 90 (1886);
Walworth v. Abel, 52 Pa. 370 (1866); Taylor v. Phillips, 30 Vt. 238 (1858); see also In
re Jacob's Estate, 81 Ariz. 288, 305 P.2d 438 (1956); Siedel v. Snider, 241 Iowa 1227,
44 N.W.2d 687 (1950); Holtan v. Fischer, 218 Minn. 81, 15 N.W.2d 206 (1944);
Beck v. Beck, 36 N.C. App. 774, 245 S.E.2d 199 (1978); Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 174
(1970).
17. T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 572.
18. Browne v. Forsche, 43 Mich. 492,500,5 N.W. 1011, 1017 (1880), quoted with
approval in Basye, supra note 11, at 384, 627. See also Johnson v. Morawitz, 292 F.2d
341 (10th Cir. 1961); First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Brown, 287 Ala. 240, 251
So. 2d 204 (1971); Swan v. Swan, 308 Minn. 466, 241 N.W.2d 817 (1976); Thomas
v. Bailey, 375 So. 2d 1049 (Miss. 1979); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Conant, 499
S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1973); Lenoir Rhyne College v. Thorne, 13 N.C. App. 27, 185
S.E.2d 303 (1971); In re Estate of Stancik, 451 Pa. 20, 301 A.2d 612 (1973). But cf. In
re Strong's Estate, 119 Cal. 663, 51 P. 1078 (1898) (property may not be distributed
other than by process of administration).
19. For an early discussion of the authorities, see 1 W. WOERNER, supra note 6,
§ 201. See also Hemphill v. Hemphill, 62 Ga. App. 358, 7 S.E.2d 762 (1940); Heinz
v. Vawter, 221 Iowa 714, 266 N.W. 486 (1936); cf Turk v. Turk, 3 Ga. 422 (1847);
Richards v. Tiernan, 150 Kan. 116, 91 P.2d 22 (1939); Needham v. Gillett, 39
Mich. 574 (1878); George v. Johnson, 45 N.H. 456 (1864). Parties may also be
precluded from contesting a will. See In re Estate of Garvey, 196 So. 2d 36 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Gay v. Sanders, 101 Ga. 601, 28 S.E. 1019 (1897); Housman v.
1983]
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standing to require probate and administration if the heirs and legatees had
agreed to settle the estate without probate or administration and creditors
were not prejudiced.2 ° Of course, in many instances, the named executor
would be a family member participating in the agreement or, if not, would
not attempt probate against the family's self interest. As a consequence, if
the family members were in possession of the assets, or if they could acquire
possession without litigation, there was no occasion for administration, as-
suming creditors and taxes were paid and all potential distributees were
satisfied. Usually debtors owing sums to the decedent who paid the heirs
voluntarily were protected. 2' As the Iowa Supreme Court reasoned:
[I]f the debtor, acting in good faith, should . . . make payment
direct to the person who would be entitled to receive it through
the administrator, and the money is not needed. . . for the pay-
ment of claims or expenses, the end of the law is accomplished,
and it would be little less than ridiculous to hold the debtor liable
to pay his debt over again. . . . The law requires no vain
Measley, 139 Md. 598, 115 A. 855 (1921); Kellner v. Blaschke, 334 S.W.2d 315
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Everett v. Everett, 309 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
20. See, e.g., Isgrig v. Thomas, 219 Ark. 167, 240 S.W.2d 870 (1951);In re Swan-
son's Estate, 239 Iowa 294, 31 N.W.2d 385 (1948); In re Sielcken's Estate, 162 Misc.
54, 293 N.Y.S. 721 (1937); Lenoir Rhyne College v. Thorne, 13 N.C. App. 27, 185
S.E.2d 303 (1971); Dover v. Horger, 225 Or. 492, 358 P.2d 484 (1960); Brown v.
Burke, 26 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Stringfellow v. Early, 15 Tex. Civ.
App. 597, 40 S.W. 871 (1897); cf Hibbard v. Kent, 15 N.H. 516 (1844); Skelly v.
Graybill, 109 Ohio App. 277, 165 N.E.2d 218 (1959).
21. See, e.g., Van Meter v. Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 239 Il1. App. 618
(1926); Christie v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 104 Iowa 707, 74 N.W. 697 (1898); Bell v.
Farmers' & Traders' Bank, 188 Mo. App. 383, 174 S.W. 196 (1915); Northern Trust
Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 329 Pa. 17, 196 A. 497 (1938); McKeigue v. Chicago &
Northwestern Ry., 130 Wis. 543, 110 N.W. 384 (1907); cf. Wood v. Weimar, 104
U.S. 786 (1881); Clark v. Perrin, 224 Ga. 307, 161 S.E.2d 874 (1968); Hemphill v.
Hemphill, 62 Ga. App. 358, 7 S.E.2d 762 (1940); Vail v. Anderson, 61 Minn. 552,
64 N.W. 47 (1895); George v. Johnson, 45 N.H. 456 (1864). In Richardson v. Cole,
160 Mo. 372, 61 S.W. 182 (1901), the court stated:
We know of no principle of law which forbids such a distribution by the
heirs under such circumstances; and if it would not be a mockery ofjustice
for a court of equity to require the defendants to pay over to plaintiff,
when there are no debts against the estate to pay, and no legitimate use
for it in his capacity as administrator, merely for the purpose of allowing
him to obtain it and use it, and then pay it back to them, less his costs and
commission, it is difficult to say what would.
Id at 380, 61 S.W. at 184. If the assets collected were used to pay priority claims,
the protection to the estate debtor was, of course, increased. Weingrad v. Lloyd, 56
N.Y.S.2d 484 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Some courts, influenced by uncertainty as to absence
of creditors or concepts of title passing to the personal representative, denied that
such protection should be given. Cf In re Clary's Estate, 253 P. 778 (Cal. Ct. App.
1927); Weis v. Kundert, 172 Minn. 274, 215 N.W. 176 (1927).
[Vol, 48
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The major difficulty in settling an estate without administration, when
the family is in agreement and creditors are paid, is in collecting assets from
recalcitrant bailees or debtors. Fearful of possible double liability to a sub-
sequently appointed administrator, they are hesitant to make voluntary
payment to the heirs and the courts have been hesitant to permit heirs to
sue without appointment of a personal representative. They have tended to
require the appointment of a personal representative to enforce collection.23
The concern has centered primarily on the problem of verifying the allega-
tion of no unpaid creditors with the frequent assertion that "such fact can
only be judicially established by due course of administration., 24 This con-
cern over creditors is a significant one which needs to be addressed in any
method of avoiding administration. In all states, creditors are protected
and can insist on administration. A second reason often advanced for deny-
ing the heir standing to sue to collect assets without administration was lack
of title. Under the view held in many states, while real property descended
to the heirs or devisees, subject to administration if administration was nec-
essary, title to personal property was deemed to be held in abeyance until
the appointment of a personal representative, at which time title vested in
the personal representative. Consequently, while the heirs and devisees
were bound among themselves by their agreement, as to third parties there
was no "authority upon their part, they not having the legal title to enforce
the payments of debts owing to the estate and unpaid., 25 This view that
title to personalty passed to the personal representative rather than the heirs
or devisees was quite common in the eastern states.26 However, many of the
western states provided that all assets passed to the heirs or devisees by
operation of law, subject to administration should administration occur.2 7
22. Molendorp v. First National Bank of Sibley, 183 Iowa 174, 176, 166 N.W.
733, 734 (1918).
23. See, e.g., Sowle v. Potter, 223 Ky. 136, 3 S.W.2d 174 (1928); Weis v.
Kundert, 172 Minn. 274, 215 N.W. 176 (1927); Champollion v. Corbin, 71 N.H. 78,
51 A. 674 (1901); see also 1 W. WOERNER, supra note 6, § 200.
24. Mann v. Superior Court, 52 Wash. 149, 152, 100 P. 198, 199 (1909). See also
In re Collin's Estate, 102 Wash. 697, 173 P. 1016 (1918); cf Broom v. Klein, 309 Ky.
224, 217 S.W.2d 206 (1949).
25. Brobst v. Brobst, 190 Mich. 63, 65, 155 N.W. 734, 736 (1916). Cf Hotch-
kiss v. Ogle, 153 Kan. 156, 109 P.2d 134 (1941).
26. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 567; Atkinson, The Development of the Mas-
sachusetts Probate System, 42 MICH. L. REv. 425 (1943); see also In re Plogstert's Estate,
350 Pa. 474, 39 A.2d 605 (1944).
27. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 300 (West 1956); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-502,
-1401 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 134.030, 143.020 (1982); Tax. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 37 (Vernon 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 312.04 (West 1976); MODEL PROBATE
CODE § 87 (1946). See also Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967);
Peterson v. Peterson, 173 Kan. 636, 251 P.2d 221 (1952); Volk v. Stowell, 98 Wis.
385, 74 N.W. 118 (1898).
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Equity courts did not view this concept of title passing to the personal
representative as being so significant and, after concluding that there were
no creditors or need for administration, would decree that equitable title
was in the heir or legatee. As the court in an early Alabama case stated:
When there are no debts, the equity of the distributees or legatees
is perfect; the legal title, if there was a personal representative,
would be a naked trust, which a court of equity ought not and
would not permit to be interposed as a bar to the equitable title of
the distributee or legatee. 8
The fact that real property was quite generally viewed as descending di-
rectly to the heirs or devisees demonstrates that this technical concern over
who has title can be controlled by a statute providing that title descends
directly to the distributee, as has been done in the Uniform Probate Code.
29
The more efficient and functional approach of permitting interested
parties to settle an estate by agreement without administration was early
reinforced by statute in some states. A former Arkansas statute provided
that no administration should be granted unless necessary to protect the
estate from waste or to protect creditors. 30 Other statutes required no ad-
ministration if the family agreed to settle the estate without administra-
tion.3 Both the case law development of the family settlement doctrine
28. Fretwell v. McLemore, 52 Ala. 124, 133 (1875). See Hancock v. Hancock,
223 Ga. 481, 156 S.E.2d 354 (1967); Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 488, 44 N.E.2d
43 (1942); Bergman v. Bergman, 247 Iowa 98, 73 N.W.2d 92 (1955); Muller v.
Sprenger, 105 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1960); Loggins v. Stewart, 218 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949); see also Reynolds v. Bowles, 213 Ga. 534, 100 S.E.2d 198 (1957);
Wilson v. Whitmore, 212 Ga. 287, 92 S.E.2d 20 (1956); Galiano v. Galiano, 213 La.
332, 34 So. 2d 881 (1948); McDonald v. Gough, 327 Mass. 739, 101 N.E.2d 124
(1951);In re Riley's Estate, 92 N.J. Eq. 567, 113 A. 485 (1921); Muhihauser v. Beck-
er, 76 N.D. 402, 37 N.W.2d 352 (1948); Murphy v. Murphy, 42 Wash. 142, 84 P.
646 (1906).
29. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-101 (1975) (Devolution of Estate on Death; Re-
strictions). This section provides:
The power of a person to leave property by will, and the rights of
creditors, devisees, and heirs to his property are subject to the restrictions
and limitations contained in this Code to facilitate the prompt settlement
of estates. Upon the death of a person, his real and personal property
devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will or to those
indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving lapse, renunciation, or
other circumstances affecting the devolution of testate estates, or in the
absence of testamentary disposition, to his heirs, or to those indicated as
substitutes for them in cases involving renunciation or other circumstances
affecting devolution of intestate estates, subject to homestead allowance,
exempt property and family allowance, to rights of creditors, elective
share of the surviving spouse, and to administration.
30. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2130.1 (1971) (repealed 1975).
31. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1314 (1936) (current version at id. § 113-
1232 (1975)); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 227 (Smith-Hurd 1941) (current version at id
[Vol. 48
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and the early statutes are venerable evidence of the practicality of informal
settlement of estates. They also illustrate the persistent attractiveness of less
formal alternatives to our usual judicial administration of estates when the
estate circumstances permit the functions of administration to be accom-
plished with less time and expense. This has generated continuing and
widespread legislative interest in the problem.
III. SMALL ESTATES STATUTES
A. Summary Administration
One of the most significant legislative developments providing for in-
formal settlement of estates has concerned small estates in which costs of
formal administration are proportionately very high. Every state has some
statutory procedure providing for summary administration or for dispens-
ing with administration in modest size estates.3 2 At this writing, the size
ch. 110/2, § 6-8 (Supp. 1982-1983)); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 395.450-.490 (Bobbs-
Merrill 1972) (amended 1980).
32. ALA. CODE §§ 43-2-690 to -696 (1975); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 13.16.680-.705
(1972 & Supp. 1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3973 to -3974 (1956 & Supp.
1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-2127 to -2130 (1971 & Supp. 1982); CAL. PROB.
CODE §§ 630-632 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-12-1201 to
-1204 (1973 & Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-266 to -270 (West 1981);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2306-2307 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-351 to -357
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 735.101-.107, .201-.302 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 53-10.1 to .4 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 560-3-1201 to -1213
(1976 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-3-1201 to -1205 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110/2, §§ 9.8-.9, 25.1-.4 (Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1982-1983); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 29-1-8-1 to -8 (Bums 1972 & Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 635.1-.13
(West Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1507, -2287 (1979 & Supp. 1982); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 395.450-.500 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1982); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1513 to -1515, -1552 (West 1965 & Supp. 1982); LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 3001-3008, 3031-3035, 3421-3443 (West 1961 & Supp. 1982); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 3-1201 to -1205 (1981); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. §§ 5-601 to -608 (1974 & Supp. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 195, § a6
(Michie/Law Co-op. 1981); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 700.010-.103, .326 (West
1980 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.3-1201 to -1204, 524.51 (West 1975
& Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 81-12-143, 91-7-322 to -327 (1972 & Supp.
1982); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 473.090-.100 (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-3-
1103 to -1104 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-24.125-.128 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 145.010-.100, 146.070-.080 (1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 553:31 (1974); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:10-3 to -5 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-3-1201 to -1204
(1978 & Supp. 1982); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT §§ 1301-1312 (McKinney 1942 &
Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-25.1 to .6 (1976 & Supp. 1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-23-01 to -04 (1976 & Supp. 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2113.03 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 241, 895, 898
(West 1965 & Supp. 1982-1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 114.515-.545 (1979); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3102 (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-24-1 (1969 & Supp.
1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-15-1650 to -1680 (1976 & Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED
1983]
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limitations on small estates range from a low of $500"a to a high of
$60,000. a 4 Some form of these statutes has been on the books in most states
since early statehood. Even though the limits on size are excessively small
in many cases, it is probable that at the time of enactment the size of the
qualifying estate was a significant, though modest, collection of assets. Fur-
ther, it appears that frequently there has been such a lag between inflation
and legislative increase in the limits that the size limitations have in some
states not kept pace with the original legislative assumptions.
3 5
The small estate statutes follow a few distinct patterns. One common
approach provides for summary distribution to the surviving spouse or chil-
dren when the applicable allowances and exemptions exceed the value of
the estate assets.3 6 In these cases, any creditors are excluded because of the
priority of family allowance or exemptions. In some statutes, high priority
claims, such as expenses of funeral or last illness, must be stated as paid or
provided for3 7 while other creditors are simply excluded for want of assets.
LAWS ANN. § 30-11-1 to -23 (1976 & Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2001 to
-2005 (1977 & Supp. 1982); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 137-144, 180 (Vernon
1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-3-1201 to -1204 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§§ 1901-1903 (1974 & Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 64.1-123 to -124, -132.4 (1950 &
Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.62.005-.030 (1970 & Supp. 1982); W.
VA. CODE § 44-1-28 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 867.01-.05 (West 1957 & Supp.
1982-1983); Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-1-201 to -203 (1977 & Supp. 1982).
33. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 553:31 (1974). New Hampshire also has a sum-
mary proceeding for estates between $500 and $2000. Id § 553:31 a.
34. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 735.101 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 145.040 (1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 241 (West 1982); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 30-11-1 (1976). See also TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 137 (Vernon 1980)
($50,000 excluding homestead and exempt property); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-10.1
(1981) (no value limit but notice and hearing required); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 395.470 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1982) (same).
35. Considering the inflationary trend of the last century and the concept of
permitting tools of a trade or other productive equipment as well as homestead to
be exempt in a reasonable amount, it seems probable that the high limits of the
legislation now on the books-$60,000--is quite reasonable and should be available
to decedents in all states under small estates legislation.
36. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-1203 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.690
(1972 & Supp. 1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3973 (1956 & Supp. 1982); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 62-2129 (1971 & Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-1203 (1973
& Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-230 (West 1981); IDAHO CODE § 15-
3-1203 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1507 (1979 & Supp. 1982); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 395.455 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A,
§ 3-1203 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 524.3-1203 (West 1980 & Supp. 1982);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.090 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-24.127 (1979);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 146.070 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-1203 (1974); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-23-03 (1976 & Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-1203
(1978).
37. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-266 (West 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS
[Vol. 48
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A single state may have alternative provisions following more than one
pattern.
Not all statutes are limited to estates in which assets do not exceed
allowable exemptions from creditors. Some statutes, however, are of suffi-
cient size to include assets subject to the claims of creditors. 38 In these latter
statutes, it is typical to require the affiant to assert that all claims have been
paid so creditors are protected in this fashion.3 9 Nearly all of the small
estate statutes proceed on the basis of an affidavit by the successors or the
petitioner. In most instances, the affidavit or petition must be filed with the
local probate court or probate clerk, whereupon distribution is summarily
ordered or approved. The statutes vary, of course, in detail although cen-
tral themes are similar and some clearly are adaptions of model40 or uni-
form acts.4" Many apply only to personal property, particularly in states
where homestead laws provide similar protection for land. Some apply to
gross estate size while others apply to the value of the estate in excess of
secured claims. Notice may be required to be given to creditors, but many
statutes expressly dispense with notice4 2 or make it optional.4" The object
ANN. § 700.101 (West 1980 & Supp. 1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.097 (Supp.
1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-24-1 (1969 & Supp. 1982).
38. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2127 (1971 & Supp. 1982); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 630 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-266 (West
1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2306 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 735.103 (West
1976 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-10-1 (1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 635.1
(West Supp. 1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 395.470 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp.
1982); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 5-601 (1974 & Supp. 1982); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 473.097 (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-1104 (1981); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2113.03 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 114.515 (1979);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 30-11-1 (1976); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 137
(Vernon 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1901 (1974 & Supp. 1982); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 867.01 (West 1957 & Supp. 1982-1983).
39. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2127 (1971 & Supp. 1982); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 630 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2306 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 735.103 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-10-1
(1981); Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.097 (Supp. 1982).
40. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2127 (1971 & Supp. 1982); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 630 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2306 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 735.103 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.097
(Supp. 1982).
41. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.690 (1972 & Supp. 1982); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-12-1203 (1973 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 15-3-1203 (1979); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 3-1203 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-1201 (West
1975 & Supp. 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-24.127 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-
1203 (1978 & Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-23-03 (1976 & Supp. 1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-1203 (1978); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-1203 (1975).
42. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.097 (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-
3-1104 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-23-03 (1976 & Supp. 1982); TEx. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 137 (Vernon 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1901 (1974 & Supp.
1983]
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of each, however, is clearly to avoid needless administration that imposes an
unnecessary burden on the transmission of family assets.
Throughout these statutes three significant features are repeated.
First, the system relies for proof of the circumstances on the affidavits of the
interested parties. These are the decedent's successors who are ultimately
entitled to the assets. Second, creditors are either provided for or precluded
by applicable exemptions and the distributees are liable to creditors and
others who might later appear with a higher priority claim to the assets.
The third important element is that the successors or distributees are au-
thorized to protect or pursue their interests by collecting from others, by
lawsuit if necessary. As a necessary part of this third factor, parties who are
indebted to the estate or who hold estate assets are required to pay or de-
liver and are protected in that payment or delivery just as they would be
had another owner or a regularly appointed personal representative dealt
with them. In brief, the statutes rely on the parties to pursue and manage
their interests and the assets responsibly in accordance with the law. Trans-
fer agents are frequently required to recognize the rights of the successors to
the decedent without a formal court order.
B. Collection Without Administration
Protection for third parties is the main feature of another common
form of statute which permits even summary administration to be avoided.
These are the statutes permitting collection of assets by affidavit, sometimes
referred to as facility of payment provisions. Typically, these statutes pro-
vide that after a certain time has elapsed since the death of the decedent
without administration having been initiated, e.g., ninety days, a successor,
usually the surviving spouse or an adult child, may collect and give a good
receipt for assets or debts owed the deceased upon presentation of an affida-
vit showing these facts and stating that the creditors are paid or to be paid
from the receipt or are otherwise provided for, that the affiants are entitled
by law to the assets, and that upon receipt the successor will account to any
person with a higher priority. Upon delivery or transfer of assets pursuant
to the affidavit, the person paying or transferring is fully protected and has
no obligation to see to the application of the assets in the hands of the affi-
ant. These statutes may be limited in application either to estates of a lim-
ited size, e.g., $5,000 to $50,000," or to the amount or nature of the assets to
1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 867.01 (West 1957 & Supp. 1982-1983). See also KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-2287 (1979 & Supp. 1982).
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 735.103 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 635.1 (West Supp. 1982). See also HAWAII REV. STAT. § 560-3-1205 (1976 &
Supp. 1982).
44. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.680 (1972 & Supp. 1982) ($6,000); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3971 (1956 & Supp. 1982) ($5,000); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-
2127 (1971 & Supp. 1982) (315,000 plus homestead and allowance); Cm.. PROB.
CODE § 630 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982) ($30,000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-21-1201
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be paid or delivered, e.g., $1,000 to $5,000, wages, or automobiles.4 5 The
statutes, however, usually do not have both of these limitations. Although
limited by the size of the estate or asset, these facility of payment statutes
essentially provide for succession without administration, with any credi-
tor's rights against the decedent transferred to or assumed by the affiant to
the extent of assets collected.
IV. STATUTES DISPENSING WITH ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT REGARD
TO ESTATE SIZE
The small estates statutes which have higher limits, e.g., $50,000 to
$60,000, and the facility of payment statutes, as well as the common law
family settlement doctrine, suggest procedures for dispensing with adminis-
tration in uncomplicated estates without regard to size whenever the succes-
sors agree and creditors and transferees are adequately protected. Indeed,
in the United States there are states in which, since early statehood, statutes
have provided for dispensing with administration in estates of any size
where no need exists for administration. These statutes supplement the de-
cisional or common law development of the family settlement doctrine dis-
cussed earlier, but usually similar circumstances are necessary to
demonstrate the lack of necessity for administration; typically, absence of
unprovided for creditors and agreement among the successors or absence of
dispute as to distribution.
A leading example of statutory recognition that administration should
occur only when it serves a necessary purpose is found in the Texas statute
which provides:
[A]dministration of the estate . . . shall be granted, should
(1973 & Supp. 1982) ($20,000); IDAHO CODE § 15-3-1201 (1979) ($5,000); IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-1-8-1 (Burns 1972 & Supp. 1982) ($8,500); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18A, § 3-1201 (1981) ($10,000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-1201 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1983) ($5,000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-1101 (1981) ($7,500); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-24.125 (1979) ($10,000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-1202 (1978 & Supp.
1982) ($5,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-25-2 (1976 & Supp. 1979) ($5,000); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-23-02 (1976 & Supp. 1982) ($15,000); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 114.515 (1979) ($10,000 personalty, $20,000 realty); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN.
§ 30-1 lA-I (1976) ($15,000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2003 (1977 & Supp. 1982)
($10,000); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 137 (Vernon 1980) ($50,000); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-3-1201 (1978) ($15,000 plus auto); VA. CODE § 64.1-132.2 (1950 & Supp.
1982) ($5,000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 867.03 (West 1957 & Supp. 1982-1983) ($5,000);
Wyo. STAT. § 2-1-201 (1977 & Supp. 1982) ($30,000).
45. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1507(b) (1979 & Supp. 1982) ($1,000);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.236 (West 1980 & Supp. 1982) (auto worth
$10,000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 81-12-143 (1972 & Supp. 1982) (savings accounts to
$2,500); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1310 (McKinney 1942 & Supp. 1982-1983)
(total not to exceed $5,000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.04 (Page 1976 & Supp.
1982) ($1,000 in wages); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Purdon 1975) ($3,500 in
wages); W. VA. CODE § 44-1-28 (1982) ($1,000 in wages).
19831
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administration appear to be necessary. No administration of any
estate shall be granted unless there exists a necessity therefore
46
When application is filed for letters of administration and the
court finds that there exists no necessity for administration of the
estate, the court shall recite in its order refusing the application
that no necessity for administration exists. An order of the court
containing such recital shall constitute sufficient legal authority to
all persons owing any money, having custody of any property, or
acting as registrar or transfer agent of any evidence of interest,
indebtedness, property, or right belonging to the estate, and to
persons purchasing or otherwise dealing with the estate, for pay-
ment or transfer to the distributees of the decedent, and such dis-
tributees shall be entitled to enforce their right to such payment or
transfer by suit.47
These provisions have been utilized in Texas for essentially all of its
history without regard to the size of the estate.4 8 In 1849, the Supreme
Court of Texas permitted the guardian of an infant heir to sue without
prior administration to recover property belonging to the decedent and de-
scending to the heir since, there being no creditors, administration was un-
necessary. 49 The statute identifies the existence of creditors and the need to
partition assets as examples necessitating administration.50 Judicial en-
dorsement of dispensing with administration is further reflected in the early
case of Angler v. Jones:5
We are also of the opinion that the application should have
been refused because it fails to show any necessity for an adminis-
tration. The mere fact that there are debts due the estate of a
deceased person does not authorize the appointment of an admin-
istrator, and incurring the expense of an administration. If there
are no creditors of the estate, and the heirs of the decedent are
known and are under no disability, no necessity for an administra-
tion is shown. The heirs in such case can sue and recover the
debts, if it be necessary to bring suit for that purpose, without the
assistance of a probate court; and the appointment of an adminis-
trator to represent them is entirely unnecessary.
52
The Texas statute is available in intestate cases or when the decedent
46. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 178(b) (Vernon 1980).
47. Id § 180.
48. The statute appeared essentially in its present form in ch. 84, § 9, 1876 Tex.
Gen. Laws 93, 96. In addition to this generally applicable statute, Texas also pro-
vides for collection on affidavit where the entire estate "not including homestead
and exempt property does not exceed $50,000." TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 137
(Vernon 1980).
49. McIntyre v. Chappel, 4 Tex. 187, 189 (1849).
50. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 178 (Vernon 1980).
51. 67 S.W. 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
52. Id at 451.
[Vol. 48
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss2/4
SUCCESSION WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION
leaves a will but no executor qualifies. In cases in which the will names an
executor who qualifies, the procedure is not available, but the independent
executor is available to accomplish nearly the same result.5"
Another long standing example of a statutory provision dispensing
with administration comes from Illinois. Early cases in Illinois recognized
that "administration is not necessary in every estate, and the statute [pro-
viding for appointment of personal representative] applies only to those
cases where it is necessary." 54 The Illinois Probate Code provided that let-
ters of administration would issue unless the court was satisfied that there
was no tax due, all claims were paid, and all interested parties were compe-
tent and desired to settle the estate without administration.5 5 The present
form of this statute substitutes "unless the issuance of letters is excused" for
the earlier language specifying the detailed findings of the court.56 This
statutory recognition of the long standing procedure for avoiding adminis-
tration in any estate continues in addition to Illinois's small estate statute
and recently enacted procedure for independent administration.
5 7
A common fact pattern in which a procedure dispensing with adminis-
tration is appropriate involves the estate which has not been administered
during the several years since the testator's death. This is the usual case in
which creditors will have been barred by statutes of limitations and no will
has been probated or, if a will has been probated, no personal representa-
tive has been appointed but some belated issue arises concerning collection
or transfer of an asset. Florida has for many years provided for dispensing
with administration not only when the value of the estate, other than ex-
empt property, does not exceed a certain amount, currently $25,000, but
also when the decedent has been dead for three years and no administration
has occurred.5" The passage of three years bars creditors' claims so the
concern for creditors' protection is absent. After such hearing as the court
may require, it may order immediate distribution to the persons entitled.
This order provides a certification of interests. In this instance, the statute
authorizes a convenient means of cleaning up the unadministered estate
without a full scale administration.
The utilization of affidavits under marketable title standards and mer-
chantable title statutes provides a frequently utilized alternative procedure
for demonstrating title to real property.5 9 Affidavits quite generally are ac-
53. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 145, 178 (Vernon 1980); see also Marschall,
supra note 13.
54. Cotterell v. Coen, 246 Ill. 410, 413, 92 N.E. 911, 912 (1910).
55. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110/2, § 9-2 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (amended 1980). See
Fleming, Summay Administration of Small and Simple Estates, 60 ILL. B.J. 734 (1972).
56. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 /2, § 9-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
57. Id §§ 25-1 to -4, 28-1 to -12.
58. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 735.201 (West 1976).
59. See P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 7 (2d ed. 1970); J. CRIBBET, PRIN-
CIPLES OF THE LAw OF PROPERTY 314 (2d ed. 1975); R. PATTON & G. PATTON,
1983]
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cepted to prove family history, death, heirship, and absence of estate credi-
tors or adverse claimants.
60
Experience in some of the community property states also suggests the
reasonableness of succession of property without formal administration.
California provides that in some circumstances community property may
pass to the surviving spouse without administration. 6 1 Washington has for
many years provided that the spouses may agree on the disposition of com-
munity property in such a way as to avoid administration and formal judi-
cial proceeding. There is evidence that this method is utilized more than
any other in that state.62
V. POLICY DIRECTIONS FROM PAST EXPERIENCE
It is generally recognized that the underlying purpose of administering
a decedent's estate is to collect the assets, pay those who have claims against
the decedent and the assets, and transmit possession with unencumbered
title to the next owner as quickly and as inexpensively as possible. The
foregoing brief review of experience in the United States with procedures
dispensing with some or all of the usual steps in administration demon-
strates that the policy concerns really are not with the size of the estate or
the nature of its assets, but with the protection usually afforded to the par-
ties by formal administration. If the functional protection of those con-
cerned can reasonably be obtained by less expensive alternatives to
administration, those alternatives should be employed.
The functions to which attention should be addressed begin with the
collection process. Someone needs to be identified as an appropriate party
to initiate the process of collecting the decedent's assets. This is the personal
representative in formal administration, but under the statutes and in the
cases allowing administration to be avoided, the successors, i.e., heirs and
devisees, can and have nearly everywhere been permitted to do this. The
size of the estate or the nature of its assets does not affect this problem of
identity. Second, in considering collection, the persons from whom the as-
sets or obligations are to be collected need to be protected from the risk of
double liability. An efficient transfer system requires the ability to rely on
the receipt of the transferee to foreclose further liability. We see that the
facility of payment statutes have successfully provided this protection, even
PATTON ON LAND TITLES § 22 (2d ed. 1957); L. SIMES & J. TAYLOR, IMPROVE-
MENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 55 (1960); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.804(d) (West Pamph. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 17-3-4-1 to -10 (Burns 1972)
(repealed 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.25.2 (Page 1981).
60. See P. BASYE, supra note 59, §§ 33-35; cf. Siedel v. Snider, 241 Iowa 1227,
1230, 44 N.W.2d 687, 690 (1950).
61. CAL. PROB. CODE § 203 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982).
62. See Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property Jurisdic-
tion, 50 WASH. L. REV. 277, 299 (1975); see also Cross, The Community Property Law in
Washington, 15 LA. L. REV. 640, 645 (1955).
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though administration does not occur. Again, it appears that the value of
the assets involved does not control the protection of the debtor in making
payment or transfer to the successors.
The next function with which we need be concerned is the protection
and payment of the decedent's creditors, tax authorities, and others who
have prior claim to the assets. If these creditors and claimants are given
essentially the same protection by an alternative procedure that they re-
ceive by administration, the alternative seems viable. The experience both
under statutes in which size limitations on small estates exceed the allowa-
ble exemptions and statutes providing for avoiding administration in any
estate demonstrate that we can rely upon the successors to pay the debts
and taxes, as individuals normally do, under the latent threat of enforce-
ment action from the claimant. If a claimant can trace assets and assert the
claim against those assets, the claimant's position is no different than when
a family member is a personal representative under obligation to pay debts.
Similarly, tax collection relies on the reporting process and that does not
depend on the character of the person making the report. If these obliga-
tions are imposed on the successors, the lack of formality would not alter the
obligations. Furthermore, if it results in lower costs, more assets may be
available to the claimants.
Finally, there is a need to identify the distributees who are the new
owners of the free and clear assets. We have seen that this is perhaps the
easiest task in an informal process since people simply have more knowledge
about their close relatives than other information in decedents' estates. And
if any unknown or unidentified potential successors are given reasonable
opportunity to come forward and prove their identity, the function of ad-
ministration in that regard is satisfied. Further, to the extent that successors
are identified at the outset and given the function of collecting the assets
and clearing the assets from claims, costs of transfer are avoided. The econ-
omies of owners managing their own assets are thereby achieved.
These considerations seem to identify the requirements of an efficient
alternative to formal administration. It is submitted that these require-
ments are met by the approach of the recent amendment to the Uniform
Probate Code providing for succession without administration. In the be-
lief that succession without administration is a normal and timely develop-
ment of the probate and administration law in all states, enactment of an
adaptation of the Uniform Probate Code amendment seems appropriate in
states that have not yet enacted the Uniform Probate Code.63
63. The succession without administration amendment to the Uniform Probate
Code, sections 3-312 to 3-322, was promulgated in August 1982 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The suggested adaptation of
that amendment to the free standing form appended here has not received the ap-
proval of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Con-
sequently, endorsement of this form of free standing act by the Conference should
not be assumed. Because the provisions of the appended draft have been drawn
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VI. SUGGESTED SUCCESSION WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION ACT
To illustrate the possible utilization of the concept of succession with-
out administration, there is appended an adaptation of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code amendment in the form of a suggested free standing act that
could be incorporated into the probate law of any state. A brief description
of this act follows.
A. General Provisions
The proposed act in Part I provides for devolution of title directly to
the heirs and devisees." Of course, any will must be probated, i.e.,
proven,6 5 but administration of the estate need not follow unless neces-
sary.66 If no administration of the estate occurs, the heirs, devisees, or other
persons are entitled to their interests in the estate subject to the usual rules
of abatement, ademption, and other claims.6 7 As in any case, a person in-
jured by the fraud of another may obtain appropriate relief, but in order to
provide for ultimate repose against such possible claims, it is required that
any assertion of fraud be proceeded on within a limited time.6
It is necessary that claims based on unpresented wills be barred by the
passage of time. A three year limitation on probate proceedings is therefore
provided.69 Any statute of limitations running against the decedent on
causes against others is suspended during the four months after the dece-
dent's death to allow a reasonable time for the successors to proceed.7 0
Creditors having claims against the decedent must also present their claims
within the period of the statute of limitations, but the statute is suspended
during the four months following the decedent's death to provide an oppor-
tunity to proceed. 71 A provision for a short non-claim statute initiated by
an optional notice to creditors is suggested if a shorter limitation on claims
largely from the Uniform Probate Code, the comments are also based on the com-
ments to those sections of the Uniform Probate Code which are the source of the
draft. However, those comments have been modified to accommodate the functions
of succession without administration.
Professor William F. Fratcher has labored long in the effort to improve and
simplify the process by which the law provides for transfer of property at death.
This makes a proposal like the statute here suggested particularly appropriate for
dedication to him.
64. Uniform Succession Without Administration Act § 1-1 (Proposed Draft
1983).
65. Id § 1-2.
66. Id § 1-3.
67. Id § 1-1.
68. Id § 1-4.
69. Id § 1-5.
70. Id § 1-6.
71. Id § 1-7(a).
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is desired.72 Because the statutes of limitations, absent notice to creditors,
may vary on different claims, a single period of ultimate repose, three years,
is placed on all claims. Consequently, all claims will be barred after three
years if not earlier barred by any limitation specifically applicable.
Many of these general provisions or analogous provisions will already
exist in the statutes of the enacting state and hence these sections of the act
will need to be closely coordinated with any existing statutes.
B. Succession Without Administration
Part 2 of the suggested statute is simply an adaptation of the substan-
tive provisions of the recent Uniform Probate Code amendment. It begins
with a declaration that the competent heirs of an intestate or residuary dev-
isees under a will may become universal successors to the decedent's estate
by assuming personal liability for the obligations of the decedent and the
estate. Only competent heirs or residuary devisees may become universal
successors, and they are obliged to protect the rights of any minors or other
incompetent heirs or devisees." Minors or other incompetents, through
their guardians or conservators, may concur or object as under existing law
and are afforded time within the limitations subsequently set out to ques-
tion acts of the universal successors.7" The requirements for the application
to become universal successors are spelled out in detail and include the in-
formation necessary to coordinate this alternative to administration with
any outstanding or pending applications for administration. The concept
of the act is to give the successors power to deal with the assets as owners,
subject to the obligations of the law. It is not an in rem proceeding. In
view of this, no inventory or description of the assets is required in the
application.7 5
The application is to be filed with an administrative officer, such as the
clerk or registrar of the appropriate court. The registrar, or the officer des-
ignated in the act, is then to review the application to determine if it is
complete and to see if any other proceedings in the estate are outstanding.
If the application is complete and timely, and if no other proceedings are
pending, the application is to be granted as an administrative, non-judicial
matter. Universal succession may be sought any time after five days have
elapsed from the death of the decedent, except that if interests are asserted
under a will, the will must have been probated within three years. Conse-
quently, universal succession is available either for the prompt disposition
of a decedent's estate or as a simple way of cleaning up an unadministered
intestacy. The procedure is designed for simple estates and if any unpro-
tected creditor or claimant objects, the application will not be granted.76
72. Id § 1-7(b).
73. Id § 2-1.
74. Id §§ 3-2, 3-4.
75. Id § 2-2.
76. Id § 2-3.
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Upon granting the application, the registrar issues a written statement
of universal succession. This document states that the applicants are uni-
versal successors to the assets of the estate, have assumed liability for the
obligations of the decedent, and have the powers and liabilities of universal
successors.7 7 This statement can be used to demonstrate to others the uni-
versal successors rights to deal with the decedent's assets. The universal
successors have full power of ownership and third persons are protected
when they engage in transactions with them.7 ' As a consequence, universal
successors could utilize any available procedure for collecting or transfer-
ring assets. The purpose of universal succession is simply to facilitate family
settlement of the estate without changing the respective rights and liabilities
of the various parties. Pursuant to this purpose, the universal successors are
obliged to discharge liabilities and distribute property to others entitled,
retaining only that to which the universal successors are beneficially enti-
tled by law. Persons to whom universal successors make distribution are
subject to the same liabilities as if they were distributees from a personal
representative. 79 This means, for example, that the impact of federal or
state taxes is not changed and the universal successors will be subject to the
obligation to file returns and pay taxes according to the applicable tax law.
These tax consequences should be considered by the heirs or devisees before
electing to utilize succession without administration.
By becoming universal successors, the heirs or residuary devisees sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of the state court in any proceeding relating to the
estate or assumed liabilities. They also waive their right subsequently to
seek appointment of a personal representative.8 0 The universal successors
have the obligation of informing heirs and devisees who did not join in the
application of the succession without administration. This information
may be hand delivered or mailed by ordinary first class mail. However, it is
not jurisdictional and does not affect the validity of the approval of succes-
sion without administration. Also suggested is a provision for an optional
notice to creditors should the enacting state prefer to shorten the regular
statutes of limitations to a four month non-claim period."1 Should a per-
sonal representative subsequently be appointed, such as on the petition of
an unpaid creditor or claimant, the universal successors are obliged to re-
store property to which they are not entitled to the estate.8 2 The liability of
the universal successors to creditors or other claimants, except for personal
fraud, conversion, or other wrongful conduct, may not exceed the propor-
tion of the claim that the universal successor's share bears to the share of all
heirs and residuary legatees. This means that, while as a group the univer-
77. Id § 2-4.
78. Id § 2-5.
79. Id § 2-6.
80. Id § 2-7.
81. Id § 2-8.
82. Id § 2-9.
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sal successors are liable to creditors in the full amount of a claim, each of
them will only bear the share of the claim that is proportionate to that
universal successor's share in the estate. This, of course, assumes the usual
priorities and abatement procedures are applicable. If greater protection is
desired, i.e., liability limited to the value of assets received, the heirs or re-
siduary devisees should not elect succession without administration but
should petition for administration of the estate.83
Creditors or other persons entitled to the decedent's property may en-
force their claims against the universal successors by any remedy provided
by law. For example, a creditor could sue the universal successors in the
court to whose jurisdiction they have submitted, or the claimant may de-
mand bond. If the demand for bond precedes the granting of the applica-
tion, it is an effective objection to succession without administration until
the claim is withdrawn or satisfied or bond is posted. If demand for bond
occurs after the application for succession without administration has been
approved, the claim must be satisfied or bond posted within ten days or the
claimant can petition for administration of the estate.84 The multiple rem-
edies available to claimants should assure that universal successors not only
perform their obligations but do so with dispatch.
C. Rights and Liabilities of Distributees
Part 3 of the suggested act, somewhat like the general provisions of
Part 1, includes provisions which may be analogous to existing statutes of
an enacting state. However, these suggested sections are directly responsive
to the rights and obligations resulting from the provisions of Part 2 and are
necessary to implement those rights and obligations. Consequently, the
substance of these provisions needs to be included in the law of the enacting
state in a rather direct and explicit form.
An instrument of distribution of assets in kind or payment from a uni-
versal successor is conclusive evidence of the distributee's title to the assets
as against all persons interested in the estate, except that a personal repre-
sentative or universal successor may recover for an improper distribution.8
5
This is the same as the prevailing rule for distributees from a personal repre-
sentative. If an improper distribution has occurred, the distributee is liable
to return the property unless protected by adjudication, estoppel, or time
limitation. If the distributee no longer has the property, the distributee is
liable for its value.
8 6
Persons who deal with the universal successors, distributees, or their
transferees are protected in the same fashion as anyone dealing with the
owner of property. Specifically, purchasers or lenders are protected. Those
83. Id § 2-10.
84. Id. § 2-11.
85. Id. § 3-1.
86. Id § 3-2.
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holding assets due the estate are authorized to deliver or pay them to the
universal successors, their distributees, or assignees. Transfer agents are also
protected in transferring securities or other assets. This protection is in ad-
dition to any transactional protection afforded by any other law.
8 7
To provide for the ultimate repose of interests, the act includes a stat-
ute of limitations providing that, unless earlier barred by other law, any
claim against a distributee is barred at the later of three years after the
decedent's death or one year after the distribution.8 8 This section is subject,
of course, to the overriding provision regarding fraud in Part 1 of the act.89
Because universal successors are also distributees, this section provides the
ultimate statute of limitations on actions against them for failure to perform
their obligations as universal successors, absent fraud. For example, a credi-
tor or a legatee who was not properly paid and had not previously taken
action would be barred from proceeding against the universal successors
after the limitations in this section had expired. However, failure to pay a
known legatee for three years may be difficult to justify as non-fraudulent.
VII. CONCLUSION
This then is the suggested free-standing statute for succession without
administration. It is submitted that it provides a worthwhile alternative to
otherwise avoidable administration proceedings in the uncomplicated es-
tate in which family members are in agreement and circumstances are such
that they can settle the estate without the aid of a personal representative or
judicial supervision. Persons interested in the estate are provided a choice
of alternative procedures. The protections usually resulting from adminis-
tration are provided by the statute. When those protections appear to a
party to be inadequate, that party is afforded the opportunity of electing
the more formal procedures of regular administration. Succession without
administration offers an opportunity to avoid the needless interposition of
judicial supervision upon competent persons dealing with their property. It
provides the lawyer with a means of handling simple estates in an informal
yet secure manner without the expenditure of needless time in unnecessary
judicial proceedings. This suggests that the burden on probate courts can
be reduced, that lawyers can afford to handle simple estates more effi-
ciently, and that competent parties can agree to settle an estate in a simple,
easily understood manner. This should result in substantial savings of time
and money in many uncomplicated estates as well as improved public re-
gard for the law and our legal system.
87. I § 3-3.
88. Id § 3-4.
89. Id § 1-5.
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A SUGGESTED FREE STANDING UNIFORM SUCCESSION
WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION ACT
Prefatory Note
This proposed uniform act is an alternative to other methods of ad-
ministering a decedent's estate. The substance of the provisions herein is
drawn from some of the procedures available under the Uniform Probate
Code, but this act is proposed as a free standing supplement to the probate
procedures in a state which has not enacted the Uniform Probate Code. An
amendment to a state's existing probate system must assume and rely upon
some of the existing procedures. Because of the variations among the states,
some of the provisions suggested herein may partially or completely dupli-
cate existing statutory provisions of an enacting state. The comments fol-
lowing each section attempt to note this possible duplication so
accommodation can be made.
Part 1 of the proposed act contains general provisions, usually found in
state probate laws, but necessary for effective operation of succession with-
out administration. Part 2 contains the provisions for succession without
administration. Part 3 contains desirable but bracketed provisions regard-
ing rights and liabilities of distributees that may already be included in the
probate law of the enacting state and which are included as models for
legislation if provisions of the enacting state are inadequate to accommo-
date succession without administration. The concept of succession without
administration is drawn from the civil law and is a variation of the method
which is largely followed on the Continent, in Europe, in Louisiana, and in
Quebec.
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1-1. Devolution of Estate at Death; Restrictions.
The power of an owner to leave property by will and the rights of
creditors, devisees, and heirs to the property are subject to the restrictions
and limitations contained in the law to facilitate the prompt settlement of
estates. Upon the death of an owner, real and personal property devolves
without administration to the persons to whom it is devised by will or to
those indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving lapse, renuncia-
tion, or other circumstances affecting the devolution of testate estates, or in
the absence of testamentary disposition, to the heirs, or to those indicated as
substitutes for them in cases involving renunciation or other circumstances
affecting devolution of intestate estates, subject to family allowances and
exemptions, if any, to rights of surviving spouse and creditors, and to
administration.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-101. The laws of some states
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provide that at death the title to all or part of a decedent's assets vests in the
decedent's personal representatives or is in abeyance until the personal rep-
resentative is appointed. This section vests title in the decedent's heirs or
devisees, much after the historical view of the descent of title to land. It is
important, however, that the provisions of this section, or its counterpart in
an enacting state's law, cover all assets, real and personal. As a conse-
quence, no administration is necessary to effect the transmission of title to
the heirs or devisees. Proof of that title may be provided by probate, ad-
ministration, or other alternatives available under the law of the state. All
heirs and devisees take their interests subject to the prior rights of creditors,
family members, and those resulting from abatement, retainer, advance-
ment, or ademption.
SECTION 1-2. Necessity of Order of Probate for Will.
Except as provided in [Section -, providing for the collection of small
estates], to be effective to prove the transfer of any property or to nominate
an executor, a will must be declared to be valid by an order of probate,
except that a duly executed and unrevoked will which has not been pro-
bated may be admitted as evidence of a devise if (1) no court proceeding
concerning the succession or administration of the estate has occurred, and
(2)" either the devisee or the devisee's successors and assigns possessed the
property devised in accordance with the provisions of the will or the prop-
erty devised was not possessed or claimed by anyone by virtue of the dece-
dent's title during the time period for probate proceedings.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-102. The basic idea of this
section follows section 85 of the Model Probate Code. The exception refer-
ring to Section - relates to affidavit procedures which are authorized for
collection of estates worth less than a maximum amount. These statutes,
similar to Uniform Probate Code section 3-1201, are found in the existing
probate law of most states. This provision should be coordinated with these
statutes in the enacting state.
Sections 1-1 through 1-3 and the provisions of Part 2 of this act make it
clear that a will may be probated without appointment of a personal repre-
sentative, including one nominated by the will.
The requirement of probate stated here and the limitations on probate
provided in section 1-5 of this act mean that questions as to testacy may be
eliminated simply by the running of time. Under these sections, a probated
will cannot be questioned after the later of three years from the decedent's
death or one year from the probate, whether or not an executor was ap-
pointed. If the decedent is believed to have died without a will, the running
of three years from death bars probate of a late-discovered will and so
makes the assumption of intestacy conclusive.
The exceptions to the section (other than the exception relevant to
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small estates) are not intended to accommodate cases of late-discovered
wills. Rather, they are designed to make the probate requirement inappli-
cable where circumstances led survivors of a decedent to believe that there
was no point to probating a will of which they may have had knowledge. If
any will was probated within three years of death, or if letters of adminis-
tration were issued in this period, the exceptions to the section are inappli-
cable. If there has been no proceeding in probate, persons seeking to
establish title by an unprobated will must show, with reference to the estate
they claim, either that title has been possessed by those to whom it was
devised or that it has been unknown to the decedent's heirs or devisees and
not possessed by any.
It is to be noted, also, that devisees who are able to claim under one of
the exceptions to this section may not obtain probate of the will or adminis-
tration of the estate to assist them in their efforts to obtain the estate in
question. The exceptions are to a rule which bars admission of a will into
evidence rather than to the section barring late probate and late appoint-
ment of personal representatives. Still, the exceptions should serve to pre-
vent two hard cases which can be readily imagined. In one, a surviving
spouse fails to seek probate of a will giving her the entire estate of the dece-
dent because she is informed or believes that all of her husband's property
was held by them jointly with right of survivorship. Later it is discovered
that she was mistaken as to the nature of her husband's title. The other case
involves a devisee who sees no point to securing probate of a will in his favor
because he is unaware of any estate. Subsequently, valuable rights of the
decedent are discovered.
SECTION 1-3. No Administration Unless Sought by Interested Party.
No estate shall be subjected to administration nor a personal represen-
tative appointed unless administration is sought by a person having, or by a
fiduciary representing a person having, a direct pecuniary interest in the
estate and its administration.
Comment
The requirement of interest for standing to initiate or participate in
judicial proceedings is expressed or implied in the law of all states. A per-
son nominated as executor does not have an interest in the estate or stand-
ing to seek administration solely by reason of being named in the will as
executor. This precludes the possibility of an unnecessary administration
solely for the purpose of obtaining a fee as personal representative against
the wishes of those beneficially interested in the estate. Although implicit in
the law of nearly all states, this section explicitly expresses this near univer-
sal policy.
SECTION 1-4. Effect of Fraud and Evasion.
Whenever fraud has been perpetrated in connection with any proceed-
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ing or in any statement filed under this [Code, Act] or if fraud is used to
avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes of this [Code, Act], any per-
son injured thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpetrator of
the fraud or restitution from any person (other than a bona fide purchaser)
benefitting from the fraud, whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must
be commenced within two years after the discovery of the fraud, but no
proceeding may be brought against one not a perpetrator of the fraud later
than five years after the time of commission of the fraud. This section has
no bearing on remedies relating to fraud practiced on a decedent during his
lifetime which affects succession to the estate.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 1-106. This is an overriding
provision that permits an exception to the procedures and limitations in the
probate code of the state or this act. The remedy of a party wronged by
fraud is intended to be supplementary to other protections provided in the
law and can be maintained outside the process of settlement of the estate.
Thus, if a will which is known to be a forgery is probated informally, and
the forgery is not discovered until after the period for contest has run, the
defrauded heirs still could bring a fraud action under this section. Or if a
will is fraudulently concealed after the testator's death and its existence not
discovered until after the basic three year limitation period has elapsed,
there still may be an action under this section. If there is fraudulent misrep-
resentation or concealment in a matter, a suit may be brought under this
section against the wrongdoer for damages or restitution may be obtained
from those distributees who benefit by the fraud. In any case, innocent
purchasers for value are protected.
Any action under this section is subject to usual rules of res judicata;
thus, if a forged will has been probated in a formal proceeding of which the
heir is given notice, followed by an order of complete settlement of the es-
tate, the heir could not bring a subsequent action under this section but
would be bound by the litigation in which the issue could have been raised.
However, the usual rules for securing relief for fraud on a court would
govern.
The final limitation in this section is designed to protect innocent dis-
tributees after a reasonable period of time. There is no time limit (other
than the two years from discovery of the fraud) on actions against the
wrongdoer. But there ought to be some limit after which innocent persons
who have built up expectations in good faith cannot be deprived of the
property by a restitution action. These limitations periods should be coor-
dinated with the enacting state's existing statutes of limitations.
The time of discovery of a fraud is a fact question to be determined in
the individual case. In some situations, persons may not actually know that
a fraud has been perpetrated but have such strong suspicion and evidence
that a court may conclude there has been a discovery of the fraud at that
[Vol. 48
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss2/4
SUCCESSION WITHOUT ADMINISTRA TION
stage. On the other hand, there is no duty to exercise reasonable care to
discover fraud; the burden should not be on the heirs and devisees to check
on the honesty of the other interested persons or a fiduciary.
SECTION 1-5. Probate, Testacy and Appointment Proceedings; Ultimate
Time Limit.
No probate or appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to
probate a will previously probated at the testator's domicile and appoint-
ment proceedings relating to an estate in which there has been a prior ap-
pointment, may be commenced more than three years after the decedent's
death, except (1) if a previous proceeding was dismissed because of doubt
about the fact of the decedent's death, appropriate probate, appointment,
or other proceedings may be maintained at any time thereafter upon a find-
ing that the decedent's death occurred prior to the initiation of the previous
proceeding and the applicant or petitioner has not delayed unduly in initi-
ating the subsequent proceeding; (2) appropriate probate, appointment, or
other proceedings may be maintained in relation to the estate of an absent,
disappeared, or missing person for whose estate a conservator has been ap-
pointed at any time within three years after the conservator becomes able to
establish the death of the protected person; [and (3) a proceeding to contest
an informally probated will and to secure appointment of the person with
legal priority for appointment in the event the contest is successful may be
commenced within the later of twelve months from the informal probate or
three years from the decedent's death.] These limitations do not apply to
proceedings to construe probated wills or determine heirs of an intestate. In
cases under (1) or (2) above, the date on which a testacy or appointment
proceeding is properly commenced shall be deemed to be the date of the
decedent's death for purposes of other limitations provisions of this [Code,
Act] which relate to the date of death.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-108. This section establishes
a basic limitation period of three years within which it may be determined
whether a decedent left a will and to commence administration of the es-
tate. But, if the enacting state provides for informal probate, the bracketed
exception assures that heirs will have at least one year after an informal
probate to initiate a contest and to secure administration of the estate as
intestate.
If no will is probated within three years of death, the section has the
effect of making the assumption of intestacy final. If a will has been infor-
mally probated within the period, the bracketed provision has the effect of
making the informal probate conclusive after three years or within twelve
months from informal probate, if later. Heirs or devisees can protect them-
selves against change within the three years of the assumption concerning
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whether the decedent left a will or died intestate by bringing a formal
proceeding.
Distributees who receive an estate distributed before the three year pe-
riod expires where there has been no formal determination accelerating the
time for certainty remain potentially liable to persons determined to be en-
titled by formal proceedings instituted within the available time limits
under sections 3-2 and 3-4. Purchasers from personal representatives and
distributees may be protected without regard to whether the three year pe-
riod has run.
All creditors' claims are barred after three years from death, See sec-
tion 1-7(b). Because of this, and since any possibility that letters may be
issued at any time would be seen as a cloud on the title of heirs or devisees
otherwise secure under section 1-1, the three year statute of limitations ap-
plies to bar appointment of a personal representative after the basic period
has passed.
The basic premise underlying all of these time provisions is that inter-
ested persons who want to assume the risks implicit in the three year period
of limitations should be provided legitimate means by which they can do so.
At the same time, parties should be afforded ample opportunity for earlier
protection by administration if they want it.
SECTION 1-6. Statutes of Limitations on Decedent's Causes of Action.
No statute of limitations running on a cause of action belonging to a
decedent which had not been barred as of the date of death shall apply to
bar a cause of action surviving the decedent's death sooner than four
months after death. A cause of action which, but for this section, would
have been barred less than four months after death is barred after four
months unless tolled.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-109. This section suspends
the statute of limitations that may run against the decedent or the succes-
sors to the asset for a period of four months after the decedent's death to
provide opportunity for the personal representative or successors to proceed
to collect the asset. After that four months, the statute continues to run
unless tolled. The tolling provisions in other statutes of limitations of the
enacting state should be coordinated with this provision.
SECTION 1-7. Statutes of Limitations on Claims Against the Decedent;
Non-Claim Period.
(a) Unless an estate is insolvent, any defense of limitations available
to the estate may be waived with the consent of all successors whose inter-
ests would be affected. If the defense is not waived, no claim which was
barred by any statute of limitations at the time of the decedent's death shall
be allowed or paid. The running of any statute of limitations measured
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from some event other than death and advertisement for claims against a
decedent is suspended during the four months following the decedent's
death but resumes thereafter as to claims not otherwise barred.
(b) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision
thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated
or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred
earlier by other statutes of limitations, are barred against the estate, the
personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless a
proceeding for collection is commenced in the appropriate court (1) within
[three] years after the decedent's death, if notice to creditors has not been
published. [or (2) within four months after the date of the first publication
of notice to creditors if notice is given as provided in section 2-8(b).]
Comment
Source: (a) Uniform Probate Code section 3-802; (b) Uniform Probate
Code section 3-803. This section provides that four months are added to
the normal period of limitations by reason of a debtor's death before a debt
is barred. It also implies that after the expiration of four months from
death, the normal statute of limitations may run and bar a claim even
though any non-claim provisions have not become applicable.
This section also means that any claim against the decedent which is
neither presented nor otherwise barred by a non-claim or other statute of
limitations would be barred if not proceeded on within three years after the
decedent's death. The existence of a statutory bar against all claims after
some reasonable period of time is essential in a system of avoiding probate.
Coordination of these limitations provisions with existing limitations of the
enacting state obviously is very important.
The limitation stated in sub-paragraph (b) dovetails with the three
year limitation provided in section 1-5 to eliminate most questions of suc-
cession that are controlled by state law after three years from death have
elapsed. Questions of interpretation of any will probated within such pe-
riod or of the identity of heirs in intestacy are not barred, however.
If the bracketed provision (b)(2) is enacted together with the bracketed
provision section 2-8(b) and notice to creditors is published, a non-claim
period supercedes the otherwise applicable statutes of limitations to bar the
claims of creditors after four months.
PART 2. SUCCESSION WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION
SECTION 2-1. Universal Succession; In General.
The heirs of an intestate or the residuary devisees under a will, exclud-
ing minors and incapacitated, protected, or unascertained persons, may be-
come universal successors to the decedent's estate by assuming personal
liability for (1) taxes, (2) debts of the decedent, (3) claims against the dece-
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dent or the estate, and (4) distributions due other heirs, devisees, and per-
sons entitled to property of the decedent as provided in sections 2-2 through
2-10.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-312 (1982). This section
states the general policy of the act to permit heirs or residuary legatees to
take possession, control, and title to a decedent's estate by assuming a per-
sonal obligation to pay taxes, debts, claims, and distributions due to others
entitled to share in the decedent's property by qualifying under the statute.
Although the surviving spouse most often will be an heir or residuary devi-
see, he or she may also be a person otherwise entitled to property of the
decedent, as when a forced share is claimed.
This act does not contemplate that assignees of heirs or residuary devi-
sees will have standing to apply for universal succession, since this involves
undertaking responsibility for obligations of the decedent. Of course, after
the statement of universal succession has been issued, persons may assign
their beneficial interests like any other asset.
The act excludes incapacitated and unascertained persons as universal
successors because of the need for successors to deal with the property for
various purposes. The procedure permits competent heirs and residuary
devisees to proceed even where there are some others incompetent or unas-
certained. The guardian or conservator of any unascertained or incompe-
tent heir or devisee may require bonding or, if unprotected, may force the
estate into administration. Subsequent sections permit the conservator,
guardian ad litem, or other fiduciary of unascertained or incompetent heirs
or devisees to object. The universal successors' obligations may be enforced
by appropriate remedy. In Louisiana, the procedure is available even
though there are incompetent heirs for whom a tutor or guardian is ap-
pointed to act and who joins in the application.
In restricting universal succession to competent heirs and residuary leg-
atees, the act makes them responsible to incompetent heirs and legatees.
This restriction is deemed appropriate to avoid problems in dealing with
estate assets vested in an incompetent. This is a variation from the Louisi-
ana practice although Louisiana permits universal succession even when a
competent heir cannot be located. The procedure also contemplates that
all competent heirs and residuary devisees join and does not permit only
part of the heirs to petition for succession without administration. This po-
sition means that succession without administration is essentially a consent
procedure available when family members are in agreement.
This act contemplates that known competent successors may proceed
under it. Although all competent heirs are required to join in the informal
process, the possibility of an unknown heir is not treated as jurisdictional.
An unknown heir who appeared would be able to establish his or her rights,
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as in administration, unless barred by adjudication, estoppel, or lapse of
time.
SECTION 2-2. Universal Succession; Application; Contents.
(a) An application to become universal successors by the heirs of an
intestate or the residuary devisees under a will must be directed to the [reg-
istrar], signed by each applicant, and verified to be accurate and complete
to the best of the applicant's knowledge and belief as follows:
(1) An application by heirs of an intestate must state that the appli-
cants constitute all the heirs other than minors and incapacitated, pro-
tected, or unascertained persons and contain the following:
(i) a statement of the interest of the applicant;
(ii) the name and date of death of the decedent, age, the county
and state of domicile at the time of death, the names and ad-
dresses of the spouse, children, heirs, and devisees, and the ages of
any who are minors so far as known or ascertainable with reason-
able diligence by the applicant;
(iii) if the decedent was not domiciled in the state at the time of
death, a statement showing venue;
(iv) a statement indicating whether the applicant has received a
demand for notice, or is aware of any demand for notice, of any
probate or appointment proceeding concerning the decedent that
may have been filed in this state or elsewhere; and
(v) that after the exercise of reasonable diligence, the applicant
is unaware of any unrevoked testamentary instrument relating to
property in this state or a statement why any such instrument of
which the applicant may be aware is not being probated;
(2) An application by residuary devisees under a will must be com-
bined with a petition for probate if the will has not been admitted to pro-
bate in this state and must contain the statements required by section 2-
2(a)(1)(i)-(v) and
(i) that the original of the decedent's last will is in the posses-
sion of the court or accompanies the application or that an au-
thenticated copy of a will probated in another jurisdiction
accompanies the application;
(ii) that the applicant, to the best of the applicant's knowledge,
believes the will to have been validly executed;
(iii) that after the exercise of reasonable diligence, the applicant
is unaware of any instrument revoking the will, and that the ap-
plicant believes that the instrument which is the subject of the
application is the decedent's last will.
If the will has been probated in this state, an application by residuary devi-
sees must contain the statements required by section 2-2 (a) (2)(iii). An ap-
plication by residuary devisees must state that the applicants constitute the
residuary devisees of the decedent other than any minors and incapacitated,
protected, or unascertained persons. If the estate is partially intestate, all of
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the heirs other than minors and incapacitated, protected, or unascertained
persons must join as applicants.
(b) The application must state whether letters of administration are
outstanding, whether a petition for appointment of a personal representa-
tive of the decedent is pending in any court of this state, and that the appli-
cants waive their right to seek appointment of a personal representative.
(c) The application may describe in general terms the assets of the
estate and must state that the applicants accept responsibility for the estate
and assume personal liability for (1) taxes, (2) debts of the decedent,
(3) claims against the decedent or the estate, and (4) distributions due other
heirs, devisees, and persons entitled to property of the decedent as provided
in sections 2-5 through 2-11.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-313 (1982). This section de-
tails the form and requirements for application to become universal succes-
sors. The section requires the applicants to inform the registrar whether the
appointment of a personal representative has occurred or is pending in or-
der to assure any administration is terminated before the application can be
granted. The section requires applicants to waive their right to seek ap-
pointment of a personal representative. The appointment of an executor
would preclude or postpone universal succession by application for appoint-
ment unless the executor's appointment is avoided because of lack of inter-
est in the estate.
The statements in the application are verified by signing and filing and
deemed to be under oath. False statements constitute fraud under section
1-5.
Even though the presence of residuary devisees would seem to preclude
partial intestacy, the last sentence of section 2-2(a) regarding partial intes-
tacy warns all parties that if there is a partial intestacy, the heirs must join.
It avoids problems of determining whether the residuary takers are in all
instances true residuary legatees, e.g., if a testator provides: "Lastly, I give
one-half and only one-half of the rest of my estate to A."
Section 2-2(c) provides that a wholly optional general description of
the assets may but need not be included to indicate to the parties the nature
of the estate involved. The registrar may not require a detailed statement
of assets.
In the event an heir or residuary devisee disclaims prior to acceptance
of the succession, those who would take in place of the disclaimant could
apply to become universal successors. The disclaimant could not become a
universal successor to the disclaimed interest and would not be subject to
liability as a universal successor.
Trustees of testamentary trusts have standing as devisees. If the trustee
is a pecuniary devisee or a specific devisee other than a residuary devisee, he
would administer the trust upon receipt of the assets from the universal
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successors and as a devisee could enforce distribution from the universal
successors.
The trustee who is a residuary legatee has standing to qualify as a uni-
versal successor by acceptance of the decedent's assets, then to discharge the
obligations of the universal successor, and finally to administer the residue
under the trust without appointment of a personal representative. The will
would be probated in any event. The residuary trustee could choose to
insist on appointment of a personal representative and not seek universal
succession. Neither alternative could alter the provisions of the residuary
trust.
SECTION 2-3. Universal Succession; Proof and Findings Required.
(a) The [registrar] shall grant the application if:
(1) the application is complete in accordance with section 2-2;
(2) all necessary persons have joined and have verified that the state-
ments contained therein are true, to the best knowledge and belief of each;
(3) venue is proper;
(4) any notice required by filed demand for notice has been given or
waived;
(5) the application requests probate of a will, the time limit for origi-
nal probate or appointment proceedings has not expired;
(6) the applicants claim under a will, the application and findings
conform with section 2-2 and the will has been admitted to probate; and
(7) none of the applicants is a minor or an incapacitated or protected
person.
(b) The [registrar] shall deny the application if letters of administra-
tion are outstanding.
(c) Except as provided in section 2-11, the [registrar] shall deny the
application if any creditor, heir, or devisee who is qualified to demand bond
files an objection.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-314 (1982). This section out-
lines the substantive requirements for universal succession and is the guide-
line to the registrar for approval of the application. Review of the filed
documents is all that is required, with the registrar expected to determine
whether to approve on the basis of information available to the registrar.
There is very little discretion in the registrar, except that if something ap-
pears lacking in the application, the registrar would be able to request addi-
tional information. The analogy to Uniform Probate Code section 3-303 is
rather direct and the authority of the registrar is somewhat more limited
because there is no parallel section to Uniform Probate Code section 3-305
as there is in a probate proceeding.
Section 2-3 (a) (5) requires that the probate of any will occur before the
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time limit for original probate has expired. Against the background of sec-
tion 1-5, which limits administration proceedings after three years except
for proof of heirship or will construction, the heirs or residuary devisees
under a properly previously probated will could in unusual cases seek uni-
versal succession after three years.
The review of the application by the registrar essentially is a clerical
matter to determine if the application exhibits the appropriate circum-
stances for succession without administration. Hence, if there are letters of
administration outstanding, the application must be denied under section
2-3(b). Even though a disinterested executor under a will should not be
able to preclude those interested in the estate from settling the estate with-
out administration, coordination of the registrar's action with process of the
probate court is imperative to protect the parties and the public. Conse-
quently, any outstanding letters must be terminated before succession with-
out administration is approved. Those with property interests in the estate
are viewed as interested persons and may initiate formal proceedings. It is
also assumed that the agreement of those interested in the estate is binding
on the personal representative under the law of the enacting state (cf Uni-
form Probate Code §§ 3-611, 3-612, 3-912, 3-1101). This, together with sec-
tion 1-3 of this act, appears adequate to preclude the personal
representative who has no other interest in the estate from frustrating those
interested in utilizing succession without administration.
There is a need for coordination with other process within the probate
court when a petition for letters is pending (i.e., not withdrawn) as well as
when letters are outstanding. The appropriateness of the appointment of
the personal representative (i.e., whether administration was necessary)
could be determined on an objection to the appointment or petition to re-
voke letters under the usual practice of the enacting state. If the appoint-
ment of a personal representative is denied, then the application for
universal succession without administration could be approved in appropri-
ate cases.
Section 2-3 does not require prior notice unless a prior demand is effec-
tive under other provisions of the probate law of the enacting state. Infor-
mation to other heirs and devisees is provided after approval of the
application. See section 2-8.
If, after universal succession is approved, a creditor or devisee is not
paid or secured, in addition to suing the successor directly, the creditor or
devisee could move for appointment of a personal representative to admin-
ister the estate properly. This pressure on the universal successors to per-
form seems desirable. In view of the availability of administration and
other alternatives under the probate law of the enacting state, if any person
properly moves for appointment of a personal representative, succession
without administration should be foreclosed or terminated.
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SECTION 2-4. Universal Succession; Duty of Registrar; Effect of State-
ment of Universal Succession.
Upon receipt of an application under section 2-2, if at least 120 hours
have elapsed since the decedent's death, the [registrar], upon granting the
application, shall issue a written statement of universal succession describ-
ing the estate as set forth in the application and stating that the applicants
(i) are the universal successors to the assets of the estate as provided in sec-
tion 2-1; (ii) have assumed liability for the obligations of the decedent; and
(iii) have acquired the powers and liabilities of universal successors. The
statement of universal succession is evidence of the universal successors' title
to the assets of the estate. Upon its issuance, the powers and liabilities of
universal successors provided in section 2-5 through 2-11 attach and are
assumed by the applicants.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-315 (1982). This section pro-
vides for a written statement issued by the registrar evidencing the right
and power of the universal successors to deal with the property of the dece-
dent and serves as an instrument of distribution to them. Although the
application for universal succession may be filed anytime after death,
within the time limit for original probate, the registrar may not act until
120 hours have elapsed since the testator's death. This period is designed to
give the family time to consider the circumstances of the estate and avoid
races to the courthouse, and it parallels provisions for informal proceedings
under the Uniform Probate Code, e.g., §§ 2-601, 3-302, 3-307.
SECTION 2-5. Universal Succession; Universal Successors' Powers.
Upon the [registrar's] issuance of a statement of universal succession:
(1) Universal successors have full power of ownership to deal with the
assets of the estate subject to the limitations and liabilities in this [Act]. The
universal successors shall proceed expeditiously to settle and distribute the
estate without adjudication but if necessary may invoke the jurisdiction of
the court to resolve questions concerning the estate.
(2) Universal successors have the same powers as distributees from a
personal representative under sections 3-1 and 3-2 and third persons with
whom they deal are protected as provided in section 3-3 of this [Act].
(3) For purposes of collecting assets in another state whose law does
not provide for universal succession, universal successors have the same
standing and power as personal representatives or distributees in this state.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-316 (1982). This section is
the substantive provision declaring the universal successors (1) to be distrib-
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utees and (2) to have the powers of owners to deal with the estate assets
subject to the obligations to others.
Details concerning the status of distributees are provided in sections 3-
1 and 3-2, and the power to deal with property is provided in section 3-3 of
this act.
Although one state cannot control the law of another, the universal
successor should be recognized in other states as having the standing of
either a foreign personal representative or a distributee of the claim to local
assets. Paragraph (3) attempts to remove any limitation of this state in such
a case.
SECTION 2-6. Universal Succession; Universal Successors' Liability to
Creditors, Other Heirs, Devisees, and Persons Entitled to Decedent's
Property; Liability of Other Persons Entitled to Property.
(a) In the proportions and subject to the limits expressed in section 2-
10, universal successors assume all liabilities of the decedent not discharged
by reason of death and liability for all taxes, claims against the decedent or
the estate, and charges properly incurred after death for the preservation of
the estate, to the extent those items, if duly presented, would be valid claims
against the decedent's estate.
(b) In the proportions and subject to the limits expressed in section 2-
10, universal successors are personally liable to other heirs, devisees, and
persons entitled to property of the decedent for the assets or amounts that
would be due those heirs were the estate administered, but no allowance
having priority over devisees may be claimed for attorney's fees or charges
for preservation of the estate in excess of reasonable amounts properly
incurred.
(c) Universal successors are entitled to their interests in the estate as
heirs or devisees subject to priority and abatement in the same manner as if
the estate were administered and to any binding private agreement among
the successors.
(d) Other heirs, devisees, and persons to whom assets have been dis-
tributed have the same powers and liabilities as distributees under sections
3-1, 3-2, and 3-3.
(e) Absent breach of fiduciary obligations or express undertaking, a
fiduciary's liability is limited to the assets received by the fiduciary.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-317 (1982). The purpose of
succession without administration is not to alter the relative property inter-
ests of the parties but to facilitate the family's expeditious settlement of the
estate. Consistent with this, the liability arising from the assumption of ob-
ligations is stated explicitly here to assist in understanding the coupling of
power and liability. Subsection (b) includes an abatement reference that
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recognizes the possible adjustment that may be necessary by reason of ex-
cess claims under the probate law of the enacting state.
In succession without administration, since there is no notice to credi-
tors, the short non-claim period under the usual probate law does not apply
and creditors are subject to both the statutes of limitations and the limita-
tion of three years on decedent's creditors when no notice is published
under section 1-7. The general statutes of limitations are suspended for four
months following the decedent's death but resume thereafter under section
1-7. The assumption of liability by the universal successors upon the issu-
ance of the statement of universal succession is deemed to be by operation
of law and does not operate to extend or renew any statute of limitations
that had begun to run against the decedent. The result is that creditors are
barred by the general statutes of limitations or three years, whichever is
shorter. Should the law of the enacting state make publication to creditors
available to universal successors, then the applicable non-claim period
could shorten the time within which claims must be presented to the uni-
versal successors.
The obligation of the universal successors to other heirs, devisees, and
distributees is based on the promise to perform in return for direct distribu-
tion of the property, and any limitation or laches begins to run on issuance
of the statement of universal succession unless otherwise extended by action
or assurance of the universal successor. An exception to the proportionate
liability of universal successors, otherwise applicable under the act, is made
in subsection (e) to limit a fiduciary's liability to the value of assets received
since guardians, conservators, and other fiduciaries have non-beneficial
ownership. In addition, this should encourage their participation in univer-
sal succession. This does not, of course, limit the liability under subsection
(b) of universal successors with beneficial interests in the estate.
It should be noted that this statute does not deal with the consequences
or obligations that arise under either federal or state tax laws. The univer-
sal successors will be subject to obligations for the return and payment of
both income and estate taxes in many situations, depending upon the tax
laws and the circumstances of the decedent and the estate. These tax conse-
quences should be determined before electing to utilize succession without
administration.
SECTION 2-7. Universal Succession; Universal Successors' Submission
to Jurisdiction; When Heirs or Devisees May Not Seek Administration.
(a) Upon issuance of the statement of universal succession, the uni-
versal successors become subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of
this state in any proceeding that may be instituted relating to the estate or
to any liability assumed by them.
(b) Any heir or devisee who voluntarily joins in an application under
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Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-318 (1982). This section im-
poses jurisdiction over the universal successors and bars them from seeking
appointment as personal representatives.
SECTION 2-8. Universal Succession; Duty of Universal Successors; In-
formation to Heirs and Devisees; Optional Notice to Creditors.
(a) Not later than thirty days after issuance of the statement of univer-
sal succession, universal successors shall inform the heirs and devisees who
did not join in the application for succession without administration. The
information must be delivered or sent by ordinary mail to the heirs and
devisees whose address is reasonably available to the universal successors.
The information must include the names and addresses of the universal suc-
cessors, indicate that it is being sent to persons who have or may have some
interest in the estate, and describe the court where the application and
statement of universal succession has been filed. The failure of universal
successors to give this information is a breach of duty to the persons con-
cerned but does not affect the validity of the approval of succession without
administration or the powers or liabilities of the universal successors. Uni-
versal successors may inform other persons of the succession without admin-
istration by delivery or by ordinary first class mail.
[(b) Universal successors may publish a notice once a week for [three]
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county, stating
their names and addresses, their assumption of liability for the decedent's
obligations as universal successors, and notifying creditors of the decedent
to present their claims within four months after date of the first publication
of the notice or be forever barred.]
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-319 (1982). The problem of
residuary legatees or some of the heirs moving for universal succession with-
out the knowledge of others interested in the estate is similar to that of
informal administration. By subsection (a) those devisees and heirs who do
not participate in the application are informed of the application and its
approval and may move to protect any interest that they perceive. When
there are several universal successors, they may join in the information to
other heirs and devisees. The provision parallels Uniform Probate Code
section 3-705.
The bracketed subsection (b) provides an optional notice to creditors
that initiates the running of a non-claim statute if this provision and brack-
eted section 1-7(b)(2) are enacted. This affords creditors an opportunity for
collection while assuring the universal successors that claims of creditors
will be known promptly. The otherwise applicable statutes of limitations
are superceded by the shorter four-month period if the notice is published.
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SECTION 2-9. Universal Succession; Universal Successors' Liability for
Restitution to Estate.
If a personal representative is subsequently appointed, universal suc-
cessors are personally liable for restitution of any property of the estate to
which they are not entitled as heirs or devisees of the decedent and their
liability is the same as a distributee under section 3-2, subject to the provi-
sions of sections 2-6 and 2-10 and the limitations of section 3-4 of this [Act].
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-320 (1982). The liability of
universal successors for restitution in the event a personal representative is
appointed is spelled out in this section and keyed to the other sections in the
act.
SECTION 2-10. Universal Succession; Liability of Universal Successors
for Claims, Expenses, Intestate Shares, and Devises.
The liability of universal successors is subject to any defenses that
would have been available to the decedent. Other than liability arising
from fraud, conversion, or other wrongful conduct of a universal successor,
the personal liability of each universal successor to any creditor, claimant,
other heir, devisee, or person entitled to the decedent's property may not
exceed the proportion of the claim that the universal successor's share bears
to the share of all heirs and residuary devisees.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-321 (1982). This is the pri-
mary provision for the successor's liability to creditors and others. The the-
ory is that the universal successors as a group are liable in full to the
creditors, but that none have a greater liability than in proportion to the
share of the estate received. Under the usually existing probate law, since
administration is available with limited liability for the personal representa-
tive, the analogy to the Louisiana system would be to accept full responsi-
bility for debts and claims if succession without administration is desired
but to choose administration if protection of the inventory is desired. If the
law of the enacting state provides for informal administration as in the Uni-
form Probate Code, that procedure would be the usually, chosen alternative.
This definition of liability assumes (1) that the devisees and heirs are
subject to the usual priorities for creditors and devisees and abatement for
them in sections 2-5 and 2-6; (2) that if a creditor or a subsequently ap-
pointed personal representative were to proceed against the successors, hav-
ing jurisdiction by submission, section 2-7, the liability would be on a
theory of contribution by the successors with the burden on each universal
successor to prove his or her own share of the estate and limit of liability
against that share; (3) that a creditor who is unprotected or unsecured
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under section 2-11 can object to universal succession under section 2-3(c),
and if the creditor does not object, payments by the successors, like those by
the decedent when alive, will be recognized as good without any theory of
preferring creditors. Thus, until a creditor takes action to require adminis-
tration, that creditor should be bound by the successors' non-fraudulent
prior payment to other creditors. If a creditor suspects insolvency, he can
put the estate into administration and after the appointment of a personal
representative would have the usual priority as to remaining assets. This
would be subject to the theory of fraud, i.e., a knowing and conscious design
on the part of the successors to ignore the priority of the decedent's creditors
to the harm of a creditor. This would constitute fraud that would defeat
the limits on successors' liability otherwise available under the statute.
SECTION 2-11. Universal Succession; Remedies of Creditors, Other
Heirs, Devisees, or Persons Entitled to Decedent's Property.
In addition to remedies otherwise provided by law, any creditor, heir,
devisee, person entitled to decedent's property, or their legal representative
may demand bond of universal successors. If the demand for bond precedes
the granting of an application for universal succession, it must be treated as
an objection under section 2-3(c) unless it is withdrawn, the claim satisfied,
or the applicants post bond in an amount sufficient to protect the deman-
dant. If the demand for bond follows the granting of an application for
universal succession, the universal successors, within ten days after notice of
the demand, upon satisfying the claim or posting bond sufficient to protect
the demandant, may disqualify the demandant from seeking administra-
tion of the estate.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-322 (1982). This section pro-
vides necessary protection to creditors and other heirs, devisees, or persons
entitled to distribution. Any person to whom a universal successor is obli-
gated could pursue any available remedy, e.g., a proceeding to collect a
debt or to secure specific performance. By this section, any creditor or other
heir, devisee, or person entitled to distribution may also demand protection
and, if it is not forthcoming, put the estate into administration. The legal
representative of any unascertained or incompetent parties may act on their
behalf. This seems adequate to coerce performance from universal succes-
sors while assuring creditors their historical preference and other benefi-
ciaries of the estate their rights.
PART 3. RIGHTS AND LxAuBrrms OF DISTRIBUTEES
SECTION 3-1. Distribution; Right or Title of Distributee.
Proof that a distributee has received an instrument or deed of distribu-
tion of assets in kind or payment in distribution from a personal representa-
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tive or universal successor is conclusive evidence that the distributee has
succeeded to the interest of the estate in the distributed assets as against all
persons interested in the estate, except that the personal representative or
universal successor may recover the assets or their value if the distribution
was improper.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-908. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to channel controversies which may arise among successors of a dece-
dent because of improper distributions through the personal representative
who made the distribution, a successor personal representative, or a univer-
sal successor as the case may be. Section 1-5 does not bar appointment
proceedings initiated to secure appointment of a personal representative to
correct an erroneous distribution made by a prior representative. But see
section 3-4 of this act.
SECTION 3-2. Improper Distribution; Liability of Distributee.
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned be-
cause of adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee of property im-
properly distributed or paid, or a claimant who was improperly paid, is
liable to return the property improperly received and its income since distri-
bution if he has the property. If he does not have the property, then he is
liable to return the value as of the date of disposition of the property im-
properly received and its income and gain received by him.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-909. The term "improperly"
as used in this section must be read in light of the manifest purpose of this
act. When an unadjudicated distribution has occurred, the rights of per-
sons to show that the basis for the distribution is incorrect, or that the basis
was improperly applied (erroneous interpretation, for example), is pre-
served against distributees by this section.
SECTION 3-3. Protection of Parties to Transactions with Personal Rep-
resentatives, Universal Successors or Distributees.
(a) If property distributed in kind or a security interest therein is ac-
quired for value by a purchaser from or lender to a distributee who has
received an instrument or deed of distribution from the personal representa-
tive or universal successor, or is so acquired by a purchaser from or lender to
a transferee from such distributee, the purchaser or lender takes title free of
rights of any interested person in the estate and incurs no personal liability
to the estate or to any interested person, whether or not the distribution was
proper or supported by court order or the authority of the personal repre-
sentative or universal successor was terminated before execution of the in-
strument or deed. This section protects a purchaser from or lender to a
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distributee who, as personal representative or universal successor, has exe-
cuted a deed of distribution to himself, as well as a purchaser from or lender
to any other distributee or his transferee. To be protected under this provi-
sion, a purchaser or lender need not inquire whether a personal representa-
tive or universal successor acted properly in making the distribution in
kind, even if the personal representative or universal successor and the dis-
tributee are the same person, or whether the authority of the personal repre-
sentative or universal successor had terminated before the distribution.
[Any recorded instrument described in this section on which a state docu-
mentary fee is noted pursuant to [insert appropriate reference] shall be
prima facie evidence that such transfer was made for value.]
(b) Debtors of the decedent, those holding property of the decedent,
and those with whom securities or other assets of the decedent are regis-
tered, are authorized and empowered to pay, deliver, or transfer to the uni-
versal successors, their distributees or assigns the debts, securities, or other
assets of the decedent's estate and the persons so paying, delivering, or
transferring shall not otherwise be accountable.
(c) The protection here expressed extends to instances in which some
procedural irregularity or jurisdictional defect occurred in proceedings
leading to the issuance of letters or statement of universal succession, in-
cluding a case in which the alleged decedent is found to be alive. The pro-
tection here expressed is not by substitution for that provided by
comparable provisions of the laws relating to commercial transactions and
laws simplifying transfers of securities.
Comment
Source: (a) Uniform Probate Code section 3-910; (b) Florida Statutes
Annotated section 735.206(b); (c) Uniform Probate Code section 3-714.
This section makes explicit what is implied in sections 2-4 and 2-5 of the
act, which gave full power of ownership to the universal successors subject
to the obligations imposed by law. Absent their knowing participation in
fraud, those who deal with the universal successors or their distributees, or
the assignees of either, are protected in those dealings. As a consequence,
others who might have claims against the universal successors are directed
to the universal successors for relief.
SECTION 3-4. Limitations on Actions and Proceedings Against
Distributees.
Unless previously adjudicated in a formal proceeding or in a proceed-
ing settling the accounts of a personal representative or otherwise barred,
the claim of any claimant to recover from a distributee who is liable to pay
the claim, and the right of any heir or devisee, or of a successor personal
representative acting for any of them, to recover property improperly dis-
tributed or the value thereof from any distributee is forever barred at the
later of (1) three years after the decedent's death; or (2) one year after the
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time of distribution thereof. This section does not bar an action to recover
property or value received as the result of fraud.
Comment
Source: Uniform Probate Code section 3-1006. This section describes
an ultimate time limit for recovery by creditors, heirs, and devisees of a
decedent from distributees. It is to be noted: (1) Section 1-5 imposes a
general limit of three years from death on one who must set aside an infor-
mal proceeding in order to establish his rights or who must secure probate
of a late-discovered will after an estate has been administered as intestate.
Hence the time limit of section 1-5 may bar one who would claim as an heir
or devisee sooner than this section, although it would never cause a bar
prior to three years from the decedent's death. (2) This section would not
bar recovery by a supposed decedent whose estate has been probated.
(3) The limitation of this section ends the possibility of appointment of a
personal representative to correct an erroneous distribution as mentioned in
section 3-4.
The last sentence excepting actions or suits to recover property kept
• from one by the fraud of another may be unnecessary in view of the blanket
provision concerning fraud in section 1-4.
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